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Alain Touraine’s Can We Live Together?1 is a radical response to the 
perceived sundering of the world into two continents, one in which all social 
ties are loosened in the face of rampant marketisation, and one in which  
communities seek to defend their purity at the cost of excluding all new ideas 
(Touraine, 2000, p. 3). He seeks an alternative in which all individuals have 
the power to forge their life projects in a multicultural social context infused 
with a spirit of social solidarity. Around this vision of an emancipated Subject 
he outlines the development of radical democracy as cultural liberation, a 
grand ideal which amounts to nothing less than the ‘recomposition of the 
world’ (Touraine, 2000, p. 195). For Touraine this necessitates first a move 
“From Politics to Ethics” and then a move “From Ethics to Politics” (Touraine, 
2000, pp. 294-305), and it is the elusive nature of this ‘ethics’ which is the 
central concern of this paper. It will be argued that while an invocation of 
ethics and a revivification of politics is indeed necessary to achieve the 
change of direction which Touraine hopes for, his unwillingness to 
contemplate anything but the ‘thinnest’ form of universalism dissipates his 
appeal to ethics and makes the call for the emergence of an ethical politics 
purely gestural. Without an appeal to an ideal of common humanity it is 
difficult to imagine an advance towards the sort of radical democratic 
solidarity that he seeks. In this paper I suggest that such an appeal to 
common humanity is available in the form of the radical humanism 
expounded by Erich Fromm (1900 – 1980) in his 1947 text Man For Himself  
and in subsequent writings. This radical humanism is an explicit character or 
virtue ethics developed decades before the revival of this approach in modern 
philosophy (Crisp and Slote, 1997; Statman, 1997), and it is central to his 
goal of cosmopolitan human solidarity.  
What follows is in four parts. The first part summarises Touraine’s 
articulation of the need for a radical new Subject but argues that despite his 
identification of the centrality of ethics in his account there is a conspicuous 
silence about the content of such an ethics. The second part outlines Fromm’s 
                                                 
1 Touraine’s book was first published in 1997 as Pourrons-nous vivre ensemble? Egaux et Differents, 
Librarie Arthème Fayard, Paris.  
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humanistic ethics as a perspective which could fill this lacuna, and also 
indicates the uncompromising nature of his anti-nationalist commitment to 
human solidarity. Although Fromm was not a political theorist, his work offers 
a sound ethical foundation on which such a political theory of human 
solidarity could be built. An essential precondition for this is the clarification of 
the central qualities identified by Fromm as necessary for the realisation of 
our human essence – reason, love, and productive work – and this will be 
dealt with in the third section. The final section considers the problem of the 
compatibility of the radical humanist approach and Touraine’s perspective. 
Despite the similarity of their goals, radical humanism calls into question 
Touraine’s reluctance to specify the ethics which he considers to be so 
important and also refutes his commitment to the nation as a vehicle for 
promoting his normative project. 
 
  
 
Touraine’s Politics of the Subject 
 
Touraine’s book confronts the problem of the increasing fragmentation of 
societies in the face of unfettered market forces. His analysis of the human 
condition and his normative commitment to a ‘Politics of the Subject’ is 
refreshing because its central thrust is the Subject conceived as the individual 
attempt to transform lived experience into the construction of the self as an 
actor. It is an assertion of freedom against the seemingly overwhelming 
constraints imposed by market forces on the one hand and the confinement 
of strong communitarianism on the other (Touraine, 2000, pp. 13–14 & p.57). 
Although the Subject is the starting point it needs for its realisation a social 
movement and a social goal. Thus democracy is its goal and the achievement 
of the Subject is deemed to be inseparable from the development of inter-
cultural communication and human solidarity. Such a goal involves the 
realisation of the three ‘inseparable’ and inter-related themes, namely the 
Subject, communication, and solidarity (Touraine, 2000, p. 301). Touraine 
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displays a hard-headed awareness of the social forces which have eroded 
progress towards achieving the old revolutionary principles of Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity, and in the age of globalisation he translates these 
principles into the imperatives of recognising cultural diversity, rejecting 
exclusion, and ‘the right of every individual to have a life story in which he or 
she can realise, at least to some extent, a personal and collective project’ 
(Touraine, 2000, p. 252). 
Touraine argues that the economy and culture have become divorced 
or ‘dissociated’ (Touraine, 2000, p. 9). The emergence of economic 
globalisation has destroyed old forms of social and political association and 
left politics in a state of decay, reducing the ambition of ‘government’ to the 
administration of economic and social organisation in order to maintain 
competitiveness in the global economy. While politicians look to the world 
market, voters look to their private lives (Touraine, 2000, p. 5). The space 
between the realities of the economic system and the desocialised mass 
culture is often taken up by increasingly conservative appeals to values and 
institutions that are no longer fit for purpose. One response to this crisis of 
modernity is to revive social models of the past which stress unity and 
emphasise ‘us’, but this call for community, even if it is infused with liberal 
sentiments, is inevitably exclusionary and therefore authoritarian. The second 
is the postmodernist view that we should embrace the rupture that is 
desocialization and celebrate the new diversity, emphasising the ‘me’, but the 
problem here is that the regulation of social life is left to the market and 
leaves us defenceless against its consequences such as violence and racism 
(Touraine, 2000, pp. 6-7). In his view this would provoke an ‘inevitable 
backlash’ of nationalistic, ethnic, or religious fundamentalisms (Touraine, 
2000, p. 149). A more promising alternative is the liberal commitment to 
procedural democracy with rules guaranteeing respect for personal and 
collective freedoms. However, this is a minimalist solution which safeguards 
coexistence but does not ensure communication – Touraine likens it to 
recognizing Chinese as a cultured language but not being able to converse 
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with the Chinese because we haven’t learned to speak the language 
(Touraine, 2000, p. 8).  
What power then, can bring together and reconcile a transnational 
economy and infra-national identities? The answer he proposes to fill this 
space between instrumentality and identity is a personal life project which 
implies a refusal to allow our experience to be reduced to a ‘discontinuous set 
of responses to the stimuli of the social environment’ (Touraine, 2000, p. 13). 
The ‘Subject’ is formed in the attempt to transform lived experience into the 
construction  of the self as a social actor, and, as such, it is the ‘only possible’ 
source of  social movements that can oppose the masters of economic 
change or communitarian dictators. The second part of Touraine’s book deals 
with how this apparently non-social principle can be used to reconstruct social 
life (Touraine, 2000, p. 14), or to defend an ideal of solidarity, as he 
expresses it in the conclusion (Touraine, 2000, p. 299). The first principle is 
one of reciprocity, whereby the Subject can develop only if others are 
recognized as Subjects striving to reconcile a cultural memory and an 
instrumental project, as in multiculturalism, the topic of chapter five. The 
second is that the Subject requires institutional safeguards, and the politics of 
the Subject develops around this project, as when he discusses an alternative 
educational system in chapter eight, “A School for the Subject”. Touraine 
argues that there is a central conflict being waged, by a Subject ‘struggling 
against the triumph of the market and technologies, on the one hand, and 
communitarian authoritarian powers, on the other.’ (Touraine, 2000, p. 89). 
This cultural conflict is as central as the political conflict between the liberals 
and monarchists in the early centuries of modernity, and the economic 
conflict between labour and capital in industrial society. 
 This idea of a central conflict erupting at the level of individual 
experience brings to mind a similar dichotomy developed by Erich Fromm, 
encapsulated in the title of his last major work, To Have or To Be?, published 
in 1976.  Fromm, like Touraine, places the normative emphasis on the 
development of critical faculties in all individuals, contributing to a social 
movement of ethical reconstruction. They both recognize the importance of 
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ethics in the development of solidarity, but Touraine’s discussion of ethics in 
the conclusion to Can We Live Together?  begs the question of what 
constitutes the content of such a liberational ethics. His consideration of “the 
ethical basis of social life” in chapter four poses the problem of the nature of 
this ethics but leaves the answer frustratingly elusive (Touraine, 2000, pp. 
137-139). Touraine concludes that neither liberalism nor communitarianism 
can explain how inter-cultural communication is possible, ‘or how we can live 
together with our differences’ (Touraine, 2000, p. 138). The universalism of 
liberalism is so far removed from the reality of social life that it offers no more 
than procedural safeguards for tolerance and cannot provide a principle for 
social integration or inter-cultural communication. Communitarians emphasise 
shared values but, argues Touraine, the logic of their standpoint privileges 
homogeneity over diversity. Even when communitarians attempt to overcome 
this problem by emphasising tolerance they fall back into a  position similar to 
that of the liberals. What Touraine seems to be getting at here is that for 
both perspectives the ‘other’ is recognized after a fashion, but remains 
estranged from either the individual or the group.  
In order to light the way for a genuine inter-cultural communication 
Touraine elects for a principle of mediation which is more concrete than the 
liberal universalist principle or the appeal to cultural communities. It is found 
in the individual action that allows us all to reconcile instrumental action and 
cultural loyalties in our personal lives, in the process of which we become 
truly individual. When society recognizes and safeguards every individual’s 
attempt to become a Subject, and encourages every individual to succeed in 
reconciling instrumentality and identity, inter-cultural communication becomes 
possible. He accepts that there can be no communication unless those 
communicating have a common unitary principle, but only the attempt at 
reconciling instrumental action and identity can supply that principle, and that 
is the definition of the Subject. Crucially, he adds that the individual cannot 
recognize her or his own desire to be an actor without recognizing that others 
also have the right to be actors in their own lives, something which he 
regards as akin to a ‘natural right or an ethical law’  (Touraine, 2000, p. 138). 
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Later in the book he reaffirms that it it not simply the recognition of the 
‘other’ that is important, but the recognition of the basis of the other’s 
subjectivization (Touraine, 2000, p. 247). Touraine clearly feels that this sort 
of appeal is preferable to an appeal to shared communitarian values which, 
he feels, implies a form of homogenising power which is bound to provoke 
resistance from the Subject. Resistance of this sort, he argues, has been 
understimated by Habermas and Rawls in their attempts to provide general 
principles and procedures which, if followed, would promote social harmony.  
According to Touraine the pain of not being a Subject gives rise to the 
‘tragic power’ of a social movement. We are divided and fragmented, but 
what can allow us to live together is the ‘kinship’ between our attempts to 
harmonise our interests and our cultural identifies (Touraine, 2000, p. 139). It 
is interesting that he chooses to use ‘kinship’ in this respect, because it 
implies a natural basis for the development of this ethic of self-realisation, but 
clearly this is not a path which Touraine wants to go down. His approach 
implies that any invocation of such ‘thick’ universal principles as ‘common 
humanity’ would lead to the negative outcomes he attributes to 
communitarian logic. However, without a consideration of common human 
needs it becomes difficult to argue why people should choose to move away 
from either egoism or enclavism. Touraine asserts that the starting point  for 
the universalism of the Subject has to involve placing restrictions on the 
powers of markets on the one hand and communities on the other (Touraine, 
2000, p. 140), but it is hard to imagine how support for such a radical turn 
could be generated on the basis of an appeal to his very ‘thin’ ethical law of 
reciprocal freedom. Radical humanism tries to address these issues by 
considering the questions of human nature and human flourishing. It aims to 
draw out from people’s own experience a recognition of the deep inadequacy 
of both egotism and tribalism and an awareness of the possiblity of richer 
ways of self-realisation and inter-cultural communication. 
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Radical Humanism 
 
In Man For Himself  Erich Fromm argues that ‘there is no meaning to life 
except the meaning man gives his life by the unfolding of his powers, by 
living productively’ (Fromm, 1990, p. 45). Fromm’s psychological inquiry into 
ethics reveals an adherence to a character ethics which lies within the 
tradition of virtue ethics, which, at that time (1947), had been eclipsed within 
philosophy as an academic discipline. Moral philosophy was largely concerned 
with a ‘rules and principles’ approach which focuses on the rights and wrongs 
of particular actions in particular circumstances, whereas virtue ethics, dating 
back to Ancient Greece, is grounded in a teleological perspective which 
conceives of the ideal character in the good society and focuses on the virtues 
which are required to achieve that end. Fromm, coming from a background in 
psychoanalysis and sociology rather than philosophy, reaches back to the 
older form of ethical philosophy to focus on questions of human essence and 
human flourishing.  
Before outlining Fromm’s contribution to humanistic ethics it should be 
acknowledged that there is great resistance in the social sciences to anything 
that smacks of  ‘essentialism’ or teleology, based on the suspicion that 
arguments of this sort may be (or must be) deterministic, reductionist and 
incompatible with the defence of difference. I have argued elsewhere that the 
radical humanist perspective does not fall into these traps, despite the fact 
that it operates with a strong view of human essence and a normative 
commitment to the fulfilment of positive human potential and is therefore 
essentialist and teleological (Wilde, 2004b, pp. 50-54; Wilde, 2000, pp. 41-
45). It is important to consider what such an ethic actually looks like and 
what it has to offer that might be absent from mainstream approaches to 
global ethics. One advantage is that it offers criteria for human flourishing 
that can be utilised to assess the extent to which certain ideas and 
movements can move us closer to the goal of ‘living together’. It is interesting 
that even Richard Rorty, an arch-opponent of appeals to ‘common humanity’,  
nevertheless feels the need to fall back on a veiled form of essentialism based 
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on the uniquely human experience of humiliation, in his attempt to argue for 
greater human solidarity and moral progress (Rorty, 1989, p. 92 and pp. 189-
91). Not only does this call into question his derision of ‘metaphysics’ (Geras, 
1995, pp. 47-70; Wilde, 2004a, pp. 162-167), but it indicates a need for 
greater clarity on the questions of human nature and human flourishing, 
something that is offered by the radical humanist approach.   
 Fromm regards the human essence not as a given quality or substance 
but as ‘a contradiction inherent in human existence’ (Fromm, 1964, pp. 116-
117). This contradiction lies in our being simultaneously part of nature and 
yet transcending nature. Unlike other animals the instinctual apparatus of 
humans is very poorly developed, but this weakness is compensated by the 
development of the essential human qualities. Human beings develop self-
awareness, becoming aware of the past and the inevitability of death, of our 
own smallness and powerlessness, and of our relationship to others as 
friends, enemies, or strangers. This self-awareness disrupts the oneness 
which other animals experience and turns us into anomalous beings, at once 
subject to the laws of nature and yet transcending nature. Human existence 
is in a ‘state of constant and unavoidable disequilibrium,’ but this condition 
generates needs which transcend those of animal origin and result in an 
‘imperative drive to restore a unity and equilibrium’ between humanity and 
the rest of nature.  
There are both regressive and progressive responses to this existential 
dilemma. As a psychoanalyst and a social psychologist Fromm dealt with the 
regressive responses, in the form of neuroses in individuals and what he 
termed a ‘socially patterned defect’ at the social level  (Fromm, 1990, p. 221). 
However, what concerns us chiefly here is his idea of a progressive response 
to the human dilemma, encapsulated in his early work as a drive towards 
freedom, and, in Man For Himself, as the development of the productive 
character. The productive character displays the independent, rational 
realization of our potentials, in a general ‘mode of relatedness’ in all realms of 
human experience (Fromm, 1990, pp. 87-88).  Through productiveness we 
resolve the paradox of human existence by simultaneously expressing our 
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oneness with others and our uniqueness (Fromm, 1990, pp. 96-97). He 
specifies the necessity of achieving happiness by the full realisation of the 
quintessentially human qualities of reason, love, and productive work. 
(Fromm, 1990, p. 45). We will clarify in the next section what ‘full’ realisation 
of these qualities meant to Fromm and what it might mean for radical 
humanism in the age of globalisation, but at this juncture it is important to 
note the utmost importance he attaches to the general social relation without 
which such a realisation was impossible, the condition of solidarity. Humans 
can find fulfilment and happiness ‘only in relatedness to and solidarity with’ 
our fellow humans, and this love of our neighbour is not a power 
transcending humanity but rather something inherent in and radiating from us 
(Fromm, 1990, p. 14). Nor was this commitment to solidarity assumed to 
develop within some vague notion of ‘society’, for Fromm was very clear that 
it was human solidarity, the solidarity of all humanity, that had to be forged. 
Furthermore, in a lecture in 1962 he predicted that the emergence of the One 
World was imminent, and that it would probably be the most revolutionary 
event in the history of mankind (Fromm, 1998, p. 61). This leaves a difficult 
problem, for such a cosmopolitan consciousness is not widespread and 
allegiances to the nation have demonstrated remarkable durability.  
Fromm’s response to the challenge of nationalism was 
uncompromising. Viewing nationalism as an ‘incestuous fixation’ which 
poisons the relationships not only of the individual to the stranger but also to 
members of the clan and to himself/herself, Fromm considers the person who 
is still in thrall to ties of blood and soil as not yet fully born, as the capacity 
for love and reason is crippled. Fromm argues that ‘nationalism is our form of 
incest…our idolatry…our insanity,’ and that ‘patriotism’ is its cult’, although he 
is careful to distinguish that attitude which puts nation above humanity and 
above the principles of truth and justice from a loving interest in one’s own 
nation (Fromm, 1991, pp. 58-59). He goes on to assert that love for one’s 
country which is not part of one’s love for humanity is not love at all, but 
idolatrous worship. In his view, nationalism offers a feeling of security which 
is unnatural, for the free person is, of necessity, insecure, and the psychic 
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task which people should set for themselves is not to feel secure but to be 
able to tolerate insecurity ‘without panic and undue fear’ (Fromm, 1991, p. 
196) In psychological terms, regression to the incestuous fixation of 
nationalism can be reversed only through the development of love and reason 
towards the goal of ‘human solidarity and justice,’ a new form of rootedness 
which will transform the world into a truly human home (Fromm, 1991, p. 
60). Fromm accepts that the tendency to remain bound to our primal ties is 
inherent, but it is constantly in conflict with the opposite tendency to progress 
and to grow, and the latter is the progressive and healthy path. We must 
choose the latter and transcend the group narcissism that is nationalism if we 
are to move closer to the goal of human solidarity. Fromm suggests two ways 
in which we could move towards a benign narcissism without reducing the 
narcissistic energy in each person. The first is that the object of narcissism be 
changed to that of mankind, the entire human family, so that the creativity of 
the species is celebrated and shared. The second is a feature common to all 
benign narcissism, namely the development of an emphasis on  achievement, 
through common goals for the eradication of hunger and disease and for the 
dissemination of knowledge and culture (Fromm, 1964, pp. 90-91). However 
distant these possibilities may appear, Fromm considers that the 
advancement of the philosophical idea of the equality of all human beings has 
at least prepared the way for the emergence of a new form of 
cosmopolitanism. 
 
 
REASON, LOVE, AND PRODUCTIVE WORK 
 
One of the problems with character or virtue ethics is that the qualities which 
are commended as of universal value are invariably culturally specific and 
frustratingly ambiguous. As such they lose their purchase when it comes to 
mobilising them into a meaningful applied ethics. In the case of Fromm’s 
radical humanism, the specified qualities are already present as 
manifestations of our human essence, but their expression is considered to be 
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alienated. The potentials are real but unfulfilled, and there is a hiatus 
between our essence and our existence. It is therefore vital to ascertain what 
the ‘full realisation’ of these qualities would look like in order to form a clearer 
picture of what would constitute human flourishing. As with Touraine’s 
conception of the Subject, Fromm focuses on the potential of each individual, 
on the explicit understanding that true self-realisation is possible only in the 
context of self-realisation for all. For a condition of solidarity to prevail  it is 
necessary that these potentials are realised by most members of society, in 
accordance with the normative goal originally expressed by Marx and Engels 
whereby ‘we shall have an association, in which the free development of each 
is the condition for the free development of all’ (Marx and Engels, 1976, p. 
506).  
Fromm’s concept of reason owes a great deal to Spinoza, who 
emphasises the need to understand the causes of the choices we make and 
the consequence of those choices in order that we can develop our active 
emotions. To submit to passive emotions generated by uncomprehended 
external forces is, for Spinoza, a failure of reason, and, indeed, he comments 
that the miser who thinks of nothing but money or profit and the ambitious 
man who thinks of nothing except glory have succumbed to a species of 
madness (Spinoza, 2002, p. 169). In Spinoza’s view, therefore, extreme 
egotism is not simply a moral failing, it is an offence against reason, and he 
argues that to live under the guidance of reason is simultaneously to seek 
what is good for oneself and to  act according to virtue (Spinoza, 2002, p. 
155). As we are naturally social beings this involves a drive for greater 
interaction with others and with the world in general (see Collier, 1999, p. 
41). Whatever promotes agreement also promotes reason and the good, 
whereas that which fosters discord is irrational and bad (Spinoza, 2002, p. 
68). As Fromm points out, Spinoza considers true self-knowledge to involve 
awareness that we are social beings and also the determination to act upon 
that awareness (Fromm, 1964, pp. 144-145).  
Translated into modern sociological discourse, the radical humanist 
conception of reason comes closer to Weber’s idea of ‘substantive rationality’, 
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whereby actions are calculated according to their efficiency in achieving 
‘ultimate ends’ which inevitably involve some sort of ethical commitment 
(Weber, 1978, pp. 85-86). In a valuable discussion of Weber’s typology of 
rationality, Immanuel Wallerstein points out that Weber draws two pairs of 
distinctions, between ‘instrumental’ and ‘value’ rationality in the sphere of 
social action, and between ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ in the sphere of 
economic action. ‘Value rationality’ refers to action informed by ethical 
considerations which is undertaken irrespective of its prospects for success, 
and Weber is clearly sceptical of its prospects in the face of the seductive 
power of instrumental rationality. However, he is far more receptive to the 
possibility of achieving substantive rationality, and this opens up the 
possibility of subordinating the pursuit of short-term individual gain to long-
term social goals (Wallerstein, 1999, pp. 141-144). The unfettered pursuit of 
utility maximisation in open markets in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century produced vast inequalities in the distribution of resources, but this 
was rectified to some extent within the industrialised countries by the 
emergence of the welfare state. In the twenty-first century, the challenge to 
reassert substantive rationality now shifts to the management of the world 
economy. Although Weber was careful not to specify what the ‘ultimate ends’ 
ought to be, for radical humanism the focus is clearly on freedom and 
equality. The aim would be to strive for a situation in which individuals are 
free to develop their potentials with an awareness that this freedom entails 
the freedom of all others to do likewise. This is very close to Touraine’s goal 
of the reconciliation of instrumental reason with cultural identity, which he 
describes as the defining feature of the Subject, (Touraine, 2000, pp. 292). 
This conception of reason brings morality back into our choices – doing 
the right thing is not simply about utility maximisation by atomised individuals 
but about the self-realisation of social citizens. As John Holloway argues in 
Change the World Without Taking Power, the formalisation of reason that has 
occurred in modernity is at the same time the separation of the is from what 
ought to be – not the elimination of ‘ought’ but its separation from the ‘is’ 
(Holloway, 2002, pp. 66-67). Now, if we reintegrate the ‘ought’ into the 
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exercise of reason this calls into question the strict separation of faith and 
reason insisted upon by many humanists. In the radical humanism associated 
with the work of Fromm the ethical choice displays a faith in the potential of 
humanity to establish a harmonious world, and as such he regards his own 
position as a form of non-theistic religiosity, in which religion is defined by its 
provision of a common frame of orientation and an object of devotion (see 
Wilde, 2004b, pp. 45-50). This opens up the possibility of communication 
between humanism and religion at the level of ethics, especially given the fact 
that most religions share a commitment to some version of the ‘Golden Rule’ 
(Küng, 1997, pp. 98-99). In practical terms the possibility of such 
communication is vital if there were to be real progress towards human 
solidarity, but the aggressively  anti-religious perspective of conventional 
Enlightenment humanism precludes this. Rorty falls into this category, for 
despite his enthusiasm for human solidarity, he dismisses appeals grounded 
in notions of common humanity as no more than ‘a philosopher’s 
invention…an awkward attempt to secularise the idea of becoming one with 
God’ (Rorty, 1981, p. 198). The problem that arises here is that the 
rationalist’s scorn for theology and metaphysics precludes a meaningful 
dialogue with millions of ‘believers’ without whose involvement human 
solidarity will remain a chimera. Fromm, in contrast, emphasises the positive 
relation between reason and religious thought, while remaining sceptical of 
the constructive impact of all organised religions. He views religion as a 
manifestation of the human need to make sense of our existential dilemma. 
In Psychoanalysis and Religion he argues that throughout the Judaeo-
Christian tradition there is a religious strain which sees God as a symbol of 
what humanity potentially can be, as opposed to authoritarian religion in 
which God’s perfection serves to highlight our own powerlessness (Fromm, 
1978, p. 37). In this respect we note here the influence of Herman Cohen’s 
Religion of Reason, in which he speculates that religion might be the ‘mark 
that distinguishes man from animal’, and argues that the origin of religion is 
reason itself, as the first attempt to make sense of the purpose of life (Cohen, 
1995, p. 6). 
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To encourage the practice of reason outlined above would require a 
fundamental change of direction whereby societies openly prioritised human 
welfare above the narrow economic needs of the economic system. The role 
of education becomes a central issue here, as has been recognised by a 
number of radical reformers, including Fromm (1964, pp. 91-92), Touraine, 
and Roberto Unger. Touraine emphasises the importance of a radical reform 
of education in his chapter “A School for the Subject” (Touraine, 2000, pp. 
265-287), and Roberto Unger does something very similar Democracy 
Realized in which he talks about schools encouraging the emergence of ‘little 
prophets’ capable of developing critical thought (Unger, 1998, pp. 229-235). 
However, such schemes tend to look Utopian in the context of the movement 
of education towards greater and greater emphasis on instrumental 
rationality. If we think rather of what tendencies there are to encourage 
substantive rationality despite the apparent triumph of neo-liberalism we see 
another aspect of globalisation, namely, the emergence of debates at the 
individual level about purpose and quality of life, at the social level in the 
various claims for recognition, and at the political level in terms of North-
South relations and issues of trade, debt, and development. The emergence 
of a variety of movements – new social movements and anti-capitalist 
networks  - is challenging this separation of the is from the ought and 
bringing the ‘big’, directional questions into wider consideration.  
Turning now to the concept of love, this does not figure largely in 
social theory because it is assumed to be so intimate and private that it is not 
appropriate to consider it at the social level. Yet this is so central to all our 
lives – even in its absence – that it cannot be ignored.  ‘Love’, writes Fromm, 
‘is the only sane and satisfactory answer to the problem of human existence’ 
(Fromm, 1995, p. 104). The emphasis which Fromm places on love reflects 
the influence not only of his reading of the Prophets and his attachment to 
philosophical humanism, but also his clinical work in psychoanalysis, for it is 
here that he was able to see the damage caused by the withholding of love in 
childhood. He argues that love is a potential within us all, a character trait 
expressive of a loving person. It is not something suddenly ‘triggered’ by our 
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interaction with an intimate ‘other’, but rather a capacity which is developed 
and expressed to all those with whom we come into contact. Erotic love, of 
course, is particular, not general, but  it is likely to be deceptive if it is not 
infused with a more general, loving disposition (Fromm, 1995, pp. 41-45). 
Thus for Fromm love is not an abstraction coming after the love of a specific 
person, but rather the premise on which that lover is based. Fromm terms his 
ideal form of love ‘brotherly’ love, which may be more usefully conceived as 
‘compassion’. It involves the responsibility, care and respect we practise 
towards others, beginning with love of the helpless, the poor, and the 
stranger, based on an understanding that what we share in common as 
human beings is far more important than our differences (Fromm, 1995, pp. 
37-38).  
In order to develop this capacity we must love our selves, not in the 
form of egotism or selfishness, but in the sense of the biblical exhortation to  
‘love thy neighbour as thyself’. Fromm regards self-love as the basic 
affirmation of one’s own life which is rooted in one’s capacity to love. Selfish 
people are not only incapable of loving others but are incapable of loving 
themselves (Fromm, 1995, p. 48), but if we are to love others then this 
implies love of humanity in general, and this must include our own ‘selves’. 
The significance of this view cannot be over-stated, for it constitutes an 
attack on self-renunciation, the psychological malaise at the heart of 
alienation. Fromm identifies two forms of this. First, the theological self-hate 
in versions of Christian thought reaching back to St. Augustine and expressed 
forcefully by Luther and Calvin, for whom ‘self-humiliation and the destruction 
of human pride’ are central themes according to whom we are powerless and 
helpless sinners (Fromm, 1994, p. 84). This view of the self as unworthy and 
miserable becomes etched deep into western patriarchal culture. It resonates 
in political philosophy in the wretchedness of Hobbes’s man in the state of 
nature and in psychoanalysis in Freud’s death instinct. The second version 
emerges only in the twentieth century with the rise of what Fromm terms the 
‘marketing character’ who adjusts constantly to the needs of the market and 
in so doing loses sight of her/his own ‘self’ (Fromm, 1990, pp. 67-82). 
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Although this character may take on a celebratory appearance it is based on a 
constant fear of ‘not measuring up’ and is often manifested in destructive 
competitiveness.  
Fromm regrets that despite the deep-seated craving for love, almost 
everything else is considered more important – success, prestige, money, 
power. Something that appears to profit only the soul and not the pocket may 
be considered a luxury for which we dare not spare our energy. Fromm 
devotes a chapter of The Art of Loving  to the ways in which individuals can 
resist the pressures of ultra-competitive society and develop the capacity to 
love. He accepts that in a commodity-greedy society it is difficult even for a 
non-conformist to express consistently a loving attitude and is in no doubt 
that ‘the principle underlying capitalist society and the principle of love are 
incompatible’ (Fromm, 1995, pp. 103) Nevertheless, the principle of ruthless 
competitiveness does not necessarily predominate in the lived experience of 
social relationships, which are often respectful and supportive despite (and 
often because of) the antagonistic structures within which they operate. It is 
precisely in this ‘space’ that the struggle to realise the potential to love might 
become embedded in social struggles aimed at resisting discriminations of 
various sorts, such as racism, sexism, and the exploitation of the less 
developed world. Such struggles open up the issue of respect for persons in a 
way which is conducive to the development of a re-prioritisation of values so 
that care for ourselves and our fellow sentient beings takes precedence over 
competitive success.  
Turning now to the third quintessentially human quality, ‘productive 
work’, it may seem to be more a necessity than a virtue. However, Fromm 
considers work, in principle, to be a key expression of our humanity. He 
argues that in productive activity we transform the world and realize our own 
nature as rational, creative beings. In his discussion of what constitutes an 
authentic ‘self’ in Escape From of Freedom he extols the virtues of 
spontaneous activity and specifies our capacity to love and work as the two 
foremost components of this spontaneity. He refers to work as an act of 
creation which binds us closer to nature in distinction from work either as 
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compulsive activity to escape from loneliness, which he characterizes as 
‘busyness’, or as a drive to dominate nature which ends up enslaving us to 
technology (Fromm, 1994, pp. 259-260). In The Sane Society Fromm locates 
productive work with the other essential qualities necessary for the 
development of an ideal society which furthers human solidarity, ‘stimulates 
its members ‘to relate themselves to each other lovingly,’ furthers ‘the 
productive activity of everybody in his work’ and ‘stimulates the unfolding of 
reason’ (Fromm, 1991, p. 276).  
 This idea that work as a creative interaction with nature is central to 
what it is to be human has the teleological implication that self-realisation 
should involve social control over our productive lives with a maximisation of 
individual choice and opportunity for self-development. However, while 
capitalism leads to an immense development of the productive forces it does 
so through a social and technical division of labour which frustrates those 
goals. In reality unskilled work is often experienced as drudgery, and even 
many highly remunerated workers experience work as incessant pressure 
which detracts from the positive experience of life (Sennett, 1998; Beck, 
2000). Fromm insists that this reaction to work as it is presently organised 
does not constitute a rejection of the inclination to work per se. He argues 
that laziness is not normal but rather a symptom of ‘mental pathology,’ that 
boredom is one of the worst forms of mental suffering, and that most people 
would prefer to be active even without monetary reward (Fromm, 2002, pp. 
100-101). So, there is a deeply rooted desire in human beings ‘to express our 
faculties, to be active, to be related to others, to escape the prison cell of 
selfishness’ (Fromm, 2002: 196), but modern society does little to satisfy this 
desire, and indeed the organisation of the productive system actively 
discourages it by imposing insecurity and coercion in various forms on the 
workers. 
 The conventional socialist solution to the problem of alienation in the 
experience of work is for the workers to take control of the productive 
process. In practice, however, state control over production normally 
excluded workers from decision-making processes. In the few examples of 
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strong workers’ participation in controlling their enterprises, those enterprises 
were still constrained by market forces. And as long as capitalism continues to 
offer greater productivity than socially-owned productive systems, the 
socialist goal remains elusive. Fromm was still committed to such a goal, 
‘where work would be attractive and meaningful, where capital would not 
employ labour but labour would employ capital’ (Fromm, 1991, pp. 283-4), 
but he was realistic enough to recognise that progress towards the long-term 
goal would need to be stimulated by reforms to the work experience in the 
era of corporate capital. In particular he gave enthusiastic support to the idea 
of an unconditional basic guaranteed income for all, for without the threat of 
the withdrawal of all income the employers would have to make the 
experience of work as attractive as possible (Fromm, 1991, pp. 335-338). 
Fromm considered that the implications of making the labour contract 
genuinely ‘free’ for the first time would have a much wider impact in 
enhancing inter-personal relationships, and this has been uppermost in the 
minds of other social theorists who have supported the idea (e.g. Van Parijs, 
1992; Gorz, 1999). In general Fromm’s appeal to promote life-affirming work 
centred on the empowerment of workers through participation in decision-
making, the democratisation of social planning, and the importance of trade 
unions in defending the dignity of labour (Wilde, 2004b, pp. 81-90). 
 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Can the radical humanism outlined above supplement Touraine’s project and 
flesh out the ethics which he wants to bring back in? In philosophical terms 
there are clear differences in the two positions but the ‘ultimate ends’ are not 
incompatible. In political terms, however, their perspectives on the role of the 
nation in forging solidarity are irreconcilable.  
The philosophical differences centre on the question of universalism. 
Radical humanism is, by definition, a universalist perspective founded on a 
commitment to the reconciliation of human existence and human essence. 
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Touraine specifically rejects two invocations of universalism, Walzer’s idea of 
‘reiterative universalism’ and Habermas’s idea of communicative action based 
on the universality of reason, and in the course of the discussion he also 
voices his impatience with the empty abstraction of Kantian ethics (Touraine, 
2000, p. 175). Instead he ‘avoids’ the problem of universalism by urging us to 
become ‘more sociological’ and less ambitious and to concentrate on the 
similarity of the processes through which all cultures struggle to reconcile 
order and change, socialisation and individuation (Touraine, 2000, p. 176). 
For Touraine, ‘the only universalism is that of a Subject defined, not by values 
or even by an appeal to the universality of its experience, but solely by its 
attempts to reconcile instrumentality and identity (Touraine, 2000, p. 178). 
This seems to me a very thin form of universalism which leaves no basis for 
an ethics which could reach out to all cultures. Without this, his appeal to 
move from politics to ethics and then from ethics back to politics (Touraine, 
2000, pp. 294-305) is rendered gestural. The ‘thick’ form of universalism that 
is radical humanism, in contrast, encourages just such a consideration of 
shared experiences, but with normative goals which can resonate with ethical 
commitments shared across cultures and religions. 
The major political difference between radical humanism and the 
politics of the Subject centres on Touraine’s commitment to the idea of 
national unity as being as much a ‘primary objective’ as solidarity (Touraine, 
2000, p. 229). Touraine is committed to a form of national identity that is 
‘oriented towards the struggle against exclusion’, one which is ‘essential if we 
are to avoid a complete break between economic globalisation and cultural 
fragmentation’ (Touraine, 2000, p. 229). He seeks to harness this powerful 
source of collective identity for the reconstruction of an inclusive society. 
From the radical humanist perspective, nationalism is by definition 
exclusionary and constitutes the principal ideological obstacle to the goal of 
human solidarity. No matter how strongly liberal nationalist arguments 
distance themselves from the ‘bad’ aspects of nationalism and emphasize the 
importance of the nation as a vehicle for unifying difference, the essentially 
tribalistic element will continue to surface. As we have seen, in Fromm’s view 
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nationalism is an offence against reason. As a psychoanalyst he was struck by 
the power of the emotional attraction of nationalism and its irrational basis. 
The anger felt by patriots when a person is deemed to have betrayed his or 
her patriotic duty is at the level of an uncontrollable deep-seated rage of the 
sort which is rarely experienced in any other situation (Fromm, 1991, pp. 59-
60; Fromm, 1964, pp. 86-87). This volatile and dangerous irrationalism does 
not provide fertile ground for the development of inclusive solidarity. The 
power of the ‘nation’ as an important source of identity is undeniably strong, 
but its irreducibly exclusive nature means that it is an illusion to think it can 
be ‘turned’ and mobilised in the cause of the emergence of the Subject and 
the recomposition of the world. Such an attempt is doomed to failure and 
would have to be abandoned in order to clear the ground for something more 
radical, the achievement of global citizenship (Dower and Williams, 2002; 
Hardt and Negri, 2001, p. 400). We have to be as bold as Cicero when he 
stated ‘you must now conceive of this whole universe as one commonwealth, 
of which both gods and men are members’ (cited in Fromm, 1998, p. 65). 
Touraine expresses the hope that today’s intellectual renewal will come 
from political and moral philosophy (Touraine, 2000, p. 300), and in recent 
years there have been indications that such a renewal may be happening 
around cosmopolitan theory (Linklater, 1998; Hutchings, 1999; Jones, 2001; 
Vertovec and Cohen, 2002; Pogge, 2002; Archibugi, 2003). Radical humanism 
offers a contribution to cosmopolitan theory and in two important respects it 
takes a critical but constructive perspective on Touraine’s project. First, in 
promoting a robust universalistic ethics it provides a much clearer picture of 
what might be involved in the projected move from politics to ethics. Second, 
it rejects the pragmatic resort to the nation as a vehicle for the development 
of greater human solidarity, moving our attention instead to the social and 
political interventions that can develop a cosmopolitan consciousness. 
Touraine is sceptical of the idea of global citizenship, describing it as ‘far 
removed from observable reality’ and ‘nothing more than the soft ideology of 
the promoters of global spectacles’ (Touraine, 2000, p. 3), yet in practice so 
much that we do in terms of effective support for people and the environment 
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has little to do with the nation-state. For sure we are experiencing a 
democratic deficit in which global politics lags behind global economics, but 
those who speak of the ‘death of politics’ are guilty of an outdated and over-
restrictive conception of the nature of politics. The struggles for the 
realisation of the potentials outlined above operate continuously at a range of 
levels of political activity, from the social processes of everyday life to the 
ongoing struggles against the neo-liberal dictates of the WTO, IMF and World 
Bank. The articulation of these struggles presents a formidable challenge to 
political activists and progressive social scientists alike, but their significance 
lies in signalling the forms of social action which would have to be involved in 
Touraine’s final step, the move from ethics back to politics.  
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